emendrix

Market Abuse Regulation

MAR · 32014R0596 · every event for this act · on EUR-Lex

Everything Regulation (EU) 2024/2809 amended · also amended Prospectus Regulation, MiFIR

in force 2026-06-05

02014R0596-20241204 → 02014R0596-20260605

Amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/2809 32024R2809

Regulation (EU) 2024/2809 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1129, (EU) No 596/2014 and (EU) No 600/2014 to make public capital markets in the Union more attractive for companies and to facilitate access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises (Text with EEA relevance)

detected 2026-08-13

18 provisions touched — 18 substantive, 0 date-only, 17 disputed · 15 changes without an explanation; 1 sentence quoting the provision verbatim where an explanation failed its citation check

Emendrix checks every change against three independent sources. Where they disagree it says so rather than picking a winner.

MODIFIED ±0 Art. 3

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 5

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 7

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 11

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 13

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED +1,412 −436 Art. 17 Public disclosure of inside information

applies from: unchanged

Paragraph 1 now excludes intermediate steps in a protracted process from the immediate public disclosure duty, requiring only that the final circumstances or final event be disclosed as soon as possible after they occur, and a new paragraph 1a requires the issuer to keep such information confidential until it is disclosed under paragraph 1.

Quoted verbatim by the citation gate — the model's own sentence did not resolve: The new text of Art. 17: "Article 17 Public disclosure of inside information 1. An issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns that issuer. That requirement shall not apply to inside information related to intermediate steps in a protracted process as referred to in Article 7(2) and (3) where those steps are connected with bringing about or resulting in particular circumstances or a particular event. In a protracted process, only the final circumstances or final event shall be required to be disclosed, as soon as possible after they have occurred. The issuer shall en […truncated by emendrix: 11510 characters omitted…]"

Paragraph 7 was expanded so that the obligation to disclose when confidentiality is no longer ensured, and the related rumour provision, now also cover inside information on intermediate steps in a protracted process that was not disclosed under paragraph 1, in addition to information delayed under paragraphs 4 or 5.

Cited: Art. 17, v2

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02014R0596-2024120402014R0596-20260605

Article 17 Public disclosure of inside information 1. An issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns that issuer. That requirement shall not apply to inside information related to intermediate steps in a protracted process as referred to in Article 7(2) and (3) where those steps are connected with bringing about or resulting in particular circumstances or a particular event. In a protracted process, only the final circumstances or final event shall be required to be disclosed, as soon as possible after they have occurred. The issuer shall ensure that the inside information is made public in a manner which enables fast access and complete, correct and timely assessment of the information by the public and, where applicable, in the officially appointed mechanism referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and the CouncilDirective 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38).. The issuer shall not combine the disclosure of inside information to the public with the marketing of its activities. The issuer shall post and maintain on its website for a period of at least five years, all inside information it is required to disclose publicly. This Article shall apply to issuers who have requested or approved admission of their financial instruments to trading on a regulated market in a Member State or, in the case of instruments only traded on an MTF or on an OTF, issuers who have approved trading of their financial instruments on an MTF or an OTF or have requested admission to trading of their financial instruments on an MTF in a Member State. 1a. An issuer shall ensure the confidentiality of the information which meets the criteria of inside information as referred to in Article 7 until such time as that information is disclosed pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article. 2. An emission allowance market participant shall publicly, effectively and in a timely manner disclose inside information concerning emission allowances which it holds in respect of its business, including aviation activities as specified in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC or installations within the meaning of Article 3(e) of that Directive which the participant concerned, or its parent undertaking or related undertaking, owns or controls or for the operational matters of which the participant, or its parent undertaking or related undertaking, is responsible, in whole or in part. With regard to installations, such disclosure shall include information relevant to the capacity and utilisation of installations, including planned or unplanned unavailability of such installations. The first subparagraph shall not apply to a participant in the emission allowance market where the installations or aviation activities that it owns, controls or is responsible for, in the preceding year have had emissions not exceeding a minimum threshold of carbon dioxide equivalent and, where they carry out combustion activities, have had a rated thermal input not exceeding a minimum threshold. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 establishing a minimum threshold of carbon dioxide equivalent and a minimum threshold of rated thermal input for the purposes of the application of the exemption provided for in the second subparagraph of this paragraph. 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 specifying the competent authority for the notifications of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article. 4. An issuer or an emission allowance market participant, participant may, on its own responsibility, delay disclosure to the public of inside information provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuer or emission allowance market participant; (b) the inside information that the issuer or emission allowance market participant intends to delay of disclosure is not likely in contrast with the latest public announcement or other type of communication by the issuer or emission allowance market participant on the same matter to mislead which the public; inside information refers; (c) the issuer or emission allowance market participant is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. In the case of a protracted process that occurs in stages and that is intended to bring about, or that results in, a particular circumstance or a particular event, an issuer or an emission allowance market participant may on its own responsibility delay the public disclosure of inside information relating to this process, subject to points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph. Where an issuer or emission allowance market participant has delayed the disclosure of inside information under this paragraph, it shall inform the competent authority specified under paragraph 3 that disclosure of the information was delayed and shall provide a written explanation of how the conditions set out in this paragraph were met, immediately after the information is disclosed to the public. Alternatively, Member States may provide that a record of such an explanation is to be provided only upon the request of the competent authority specified under paragraph 3. By way of derogation from the third second subparagraph of this paragraph, an issuer whose financial instruments are admitted to trading only on an SME growth market shall provide a written explanation to the competent authority specified under paragraph 3 only upon request. As long as the issuer is able to justify its decision to delay, the issuer shall not be required to keep a record of that explanation. 4a. Non-disclosure by an issuer of inside information related to intermediate steps in protracted processes, in accordance with paragraph 1, is not subject to the requirements laid down in paragraph 4. 5. An issuer that is a credit institution or a financial institution or an issuer that is a parent undertaking of such an institution, may, on its own responsibility, delay the public disclosure of inside information, including information which is … 394 unchanged words … paragraph 3 is without prejudice to the ability of the competent authority to exercise its functions in any of the ways referred to in Article 23(1). 7. Where disclosure of inside information has been delayed in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5 5, or where inside information relating to intermediate steps in a protracted process has not been disclosed in accordance with paragraph 1, and the confidentiality of that inside information is no longer ensured, the issuer or the emission allowance market participant shall disclose that inside information to the public as soon as possible. This paragraph includes situations where a rumour explicitly relates to inside information the disclosure of which has been delayed in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5, or to inside information related to intermediate steps in a protracted process that has not been disclosed in accordance with paragraph 1, where that rumour is sufficiently accurate to indicate that the confidentiality of that information is no longer ensured. 8. Where an issuer or an emission allowance market participant, or a person acting on their behalf or for their account, discloses any … 337 unchanged words … in contrast with the latest public announcement or other type of communication by the issuer or emission allowance market participant on the same matter to which the inside information refers, as referred to in paragraph 4, first subparagraph, point (b).

MODIFIED ±0 Art. 18

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

No explanation shipped — the structural diff did not see this change, so it carries no text; another signal named the unit and the disagreement ships as `disputed`.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 19

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 23

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 25

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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INSERTED ±0 Art. 25a

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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INSERTED ±0 Art. 25b

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DELETED ±0 Art. 28

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Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 29

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

No explanation shipped — the structural diff did not see this change, so it carries no text; another signal named the unit and the disagreement ships as `disputed`.

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MODIFIED +2,110 −162 Art. 30 Administrative sanctions and other administrative measures

applies from: unchanged

Sources disagree — the text comparison and the amending act's instructions found this change; the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

Points (e) to (g) now extend the temporary or permanent management-function and dealing-on-own-account bans so that they also cover managerial persons in benchmark administrators or supervised contributors, and the previously permanent ban for repeated infringements of Article 14 or 15 is now specified as a ban of at least 10 years.

Point (j) reorders the turnover-versus-fixed-amount wording for infringements of Articles 14 and 15, replaces the single combined percentage/amount rule for Articles 16 and 17 with separate sub-points for Article 16 and Article 17, the latter adding a disproportionality test with minimum floors of EUR 2500000 or, for SMEs, EUR 1000000, and similarly splits the Articles 18 to 20 rule into a new sub-point for Articles 18 and 19 with a 0,8% turnover figure and disproportionality floors of EUR 1000000 or, for SMEs, EUR 400000, and a separate sub-point for Article 20 with a 0,8% turnover or EUR 1000000 figure.

The cross-reference for the parent/subsidiary turnover calculation rule is changed from referring to points (j)(i) and (ii) of the first subparagraph to referring to the first subparagraph, point (j), as a whole.

Cited: Art. 30, v2 · Art. 30, v1

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Article 30 Administrative sanctions and other administrative measures 1. Without prejudice to any criminal sanctions and without prejudice to the supervisory powers of competent authorities under Article 23, Member States shall, in accordance with national law, provide for competent authorities to have the power to take appropriate administrative sanctions and other administrative measures in relation to at least the following infringements: (a) infringements of Articles 14 and 15, Article 16(1) and (2), Article 17(1), (2), (4) and (5), and (8), Article 18(1) to (6), Article 19(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (11) and Article 20(1); and (b) failure to cooperate or to comply with an investigation, with an inspection or with a request as referred to in Article 23(2). Member States may decide not to lay down rules for administrative sanctions as referred to in the first subparagraph where the infringements referred to in point (a) or point (b) of that subparagraph are already subject to criminal sanctions in their national law by 3 July 2016. Where they so decide, Member States shall notify, in detail, to the Commission and to ESMA, the relevant parts of their criminal law. By 3 July 2016, Member States shall notify, in detail, the rules referred to in the first and second subparagraph to the Commission and to ESMA. They shall notify the Commission and ESMA without delay of any subsequent amendments thereto. 2. Member States shall, in accordance with national law, ensure that competent authorities have the power to impose at least the following administrative sanctions and to take at least the following administrative measures in the event of the infringements referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1: (a) an order requiring the person responsible for the infringement to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct; (b) the disgorgement of the profits gained or losses avoided due to the infringement insofar as they can be determined; (c) a public warning which indicates the person responsible for the infringement and the nature of the infringement; (d) withdrawal or suspension of the authorisation of an investment firm; (e) a temporary ban of a person discharging managerial responsibilities within an investment firm or any other natural person, who is held responsible for the infringement, from exercising management functions in investment firms; firms, as well as in benchmark administrators or in supervised contributors; (f) in the event of repeated infringements of Article 14 or 15, a permanent ban of at least 10 years of any person discharging managerial responsibilities within an investment firm firm, a benchmark administrator or supervised contributor or any other natural person who is held responsible for the infringement, from exercising management functions in investment firms; firms, as well as in benchmark administrators or in supervised contributors; (g) a temporary ban of a person discharging managerial responsibilities within an investment firm firm, a benchmark administrator or another a supervised contributor, or any other natural person who is held responsible for the infringement, from dealing on own account; (h) maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least three times the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement, where those can be determined; (i) in respect of a natural person, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least: (i) for infringements of Articles 14 and 15, EUR 5000000 or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 2 July 2014; (ii) for infringements of Articles 16 and 17, EUR 1000000 or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 2 July 2014; and (iii) for infringements of Articles 18, 19 and 20, EUR 500000 or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 2 July 2014; and (j) in respect of legal persons, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least: (i) for infringements of Articles 14 and 15, EUR 15000000 or 15 % of the total annual turnover of the legal person according to the last available accounts approved by the management body, body or EUR 15000000 or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 2 July 2014; (ii) for infringements of Articles 16 and 17, EUR 2500000 or Article 16, 2 % of its total annual turnover according to the last available accounts approved by the management body, or EUR 2500000 or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 2 July 2014; and (iii) for infringements of Articles 18, 19 Article 17, 2 % of its total annual turnover according to the last available accounts approved by the management body. Where competent authorities deem that the amount for the administrative sanction based on the total annual turnover would be disproportionately low with respect to the circumstances referred to in Article 31(1), points (a), (b), and 20, (d) to (h), Member States shall ensure that such authorities may impose administrative sanctions of at least EUR 2500000. Where the legal person is an SME, Member States may ensure that such authorities may alternatively impose administrative sanctions of at least EUR 1000000 or or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value values in the national currency on 2 July 2014; (iv) for infringements of Articles 18 and 19, 0,8 % of its total annual turnover according to the last available accounts approved by the management body. Where competent authorities deem that the amount for the administrative sanction based on the total annual turnover would be disproportionately low with respect to the circumstances referred to in Article 31(1), points (a), (b), and (d) to (h), Member States shall ensure that such authorities may impose administrative sanctions of at least EUR 1000000. Where the legal person is an SME, Member States may ensure that such authorities may alternatively impose administrative sanctions of at least EUR 400000 or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding values in the national currency on 2 July 2014; (v) for infringements of Article 20, 0,8 % of its total annual turnover according to the last available accounts approved by the management body, or EUR 1000000 or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding values in the national currency on 2 July 2014. References to the competent authority in this paragraph are without prejudice to the ability of the competent authority to exercise its functions in any ways referred to in Article 23(1). For the purposes of points (j)(i) and (ii) of the first subparagraph, point (j), where the legal person is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts pursuant to Directive 2013/34/EUDirective 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the CouncilDirective 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19)., the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting directives – Council Directive 86/635/EECCouncil Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions (OJ L 372, 31.12.1986, p. 1). for banks and Council Directive 91/674/EECCouncil Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings (OJ L 374, 31.12.1991, p. 7). for insurance companies – according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking. 3. Member States may provide that competent authorities have powers in addition to those referred to in paragraph 2 and may provide for higher levels of sanctions than those established in that paragraph. 4. For the purpose of this Article, small and medium-sized enterprise or SME means a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/ECCommission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36)..

MODIFIED +258 −28 Art. 31 Exercise of supervisory powers and imposition of sanctions

applies from: unchanged

Sources disagree — the text comparison and the amending act's instructions found this change; the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

The introductory clause of paragraph 1 now adds that the relevant circumstances are to be taken into account in order to apply proportionate sanctions, a phrase absent from the earlier text.

Point (c) now refers to the annual personal income of a natural person, where the earlier version referred simply to the annual income of a natural person.

A new point (h) has been added, addressing the disadvantage for the person responsible for the infringement resulting from the duplication of criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties for the same conduct, with the connecting words between points (f), (g) and (h) adjusted accordingly.

Cited: Art. 31, v2 · Art. 31, v1

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Article 31 Exercise of supervisory powers and imposition of sanctions 1. Member States shall ensure that when determining the type and level of administrative sanctions, competent authorities take into account all relevant circumstances, circumstances in order to apply proportionate sanctions, including, where appropriate: (a) the gravity and duration of the infringement; (b) the degree of responsibility of the person responsible for the infringement; (c) the financial strength of the person responsible for the infringement, as indicated, for example, by the total turnover of a legal person or the annual personal income of a natural person; (d) the importance of the profits gained or losses avoided by the person responsible for the infringement, insofar as they can be determined; (e) the level of cooperation of the person responsible for the infringement with the competent authority, without prejudice to the need to ensure disgorgement of profits gained or losses avoided by that person; (f) previous infringements by the person responsible for the infringement; and (g) measures taken by the person responsible for the infringement to prevent its repetition. repetition; and (h) the disadvantage for the person responsible for the infringement resulting from the duplication of criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties for the same conduct. 2. In the exercise of their powers to impose administrative sanctions and other administrative measures under Article 30, competent authorities shall cooperate closely to ensure that the exercise of their supervisory and investigative powers, and the administrative sanctions that they impose, and the other administrative measures that they take, are effective and appropriate under this Regulation. They shall coordinate their actions in accordance with Article 25 in order to avoid duplication and overlaps when exercising their supervisory and investigative powers and when imposing administrative sanctions in respect of cross-border cases.

MODIFIED ±0 Art. 35

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

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MODIFIED ±0 Art. 38

applies from: unknown

Sources disagree — the amending act's instructions found this change; the text comparison finds no difference in the provision's text and the EU's own amendment metadata does not list it. All are shown; none is overruled.

No explanation shipped — the structural diff did not see this change, so it carries no text; another signal named the unit and the disagreement ships as `disputed`.

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The full entry, with the citation mapping v1 = 02014R0596-20241204, v2 = 02014R0596-20260605, is committed at eu/32014R0596/CHANGELOG.md.