emendrix

Art. 13

Anti-Subsidy Regulation · 32016R1037 · every event for this act · on EUR-Lex

Undertakings

1 change recorded across 1 event, newest first.

in force 2018-06-08 MODIFIED+984 −159

Amended by Regulation (EU) 2018/825 32018R0825

applies from: unchanged

Paragraph 1 now conditions any lesser price increase (below the full countervailable subsidy amount) on a Commission finding that it cannot clearly conclude provisionally that determining the increase under the third subparagraph would be against the Union's interest, whereas the earlier text simply allowed a lower increase if adequate to remove injury.

Paragraph 2's deadline for offering undertakings was moved from the end of the comment period under Article 30(5) to five days before that end, with added wording about ensuring an opportunity for other parties to comment.

Paragraph 3 now specifies that general policy reasons for rejecting an undertaking include principles and obligations under multilateral environmental agreements and ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia, and paragraph 4 adds requirements that the non-confidential undertaking version be meaningful under Article 29, be shared also with the European Parliament and Council, and that the Union industry be given a chance to comment on the undertaking's main features before acceptance.

Cited: Art. 13, v1 · Art. 13, v2

text before / after

02016R1037-2017122002016R1037-20180608

Article 13 Undertakings 1. On the condition that Where a provisional affirmative determination of subsidisation and injury has been made, the Commission may may, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 25(2) 25(2), accept satisfactory voluntary undertakings offers under which: (a) the country of origin and/or export agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take other measures concerning its effects; or (b) any exporter undertakes to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question as long as such exports benefit from countervailable subsidies, so that the Commission is satisfied that if the injurious effect of the subsidies is thereby eliminated. In such a case and as long as such undertakings are in force, the provisional duties imposed by the Commission in accordance with Article 12(3) and the 12(3), or definitive duties imposed in accordance with Article 15(1) 15(1), as the case may be, shall not apply to the relevant imports of the product concerned manufactured by the companies referred to in the Commission decision accepting undertakings, as subsequently amended. Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to offset the amount of countervailable subsidies, and should subsidies. Where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude provisionally that it is not in the Union’s interest to determine the price increase under such undertakings, in accordance with the third subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article, the increase under such undertakings shall be less than the amount of countervailable subsidies if such increases increase would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. 2. Undertakings may be suggested by the Commission, but no country or exporter shall be obliged to enter into such an undertaking. The fact that countries or exporters do not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice consideration of the case. However, it may be determined that a threat of injury is more likely to be realised if the subsidised imports continue. Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted from countries or exporters unless a provisional affirmative determination of subsidisation and injury caused by such subsidisation has been made. Save in exceptional circumstances, undertakings may not be offered later than five days prior to the end of the period during which representations may be made pursuant to Article 30(5). 30(5), so as to ensure the opportunity to comment for other parties. 3. Undertakings offered need not be accepted if their acceptance is considered impractical, such as where the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy. policy which comprise in particular the principles and obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia to this Regulation. The exporter and/or the country of origin and/or export concerned may be provided with the reasons for which it is proposed to reject the offer of an undertaking and may be given an opportunity to make comments thereon. The reasons for rejection shall be set out in the definitive decision. 4. Parties which offer an undertaking shall be required to provide a non-confidential version of such undertaking that undertaking, is meaningful in the sense of Article 29, so that it may be made available to interested parties to the investigation. investigation, to the European Parliament and to the Council. Furthermore, before accepting any such offer, the Union industry shall be given an opportunity to comment with regard to the main features of the undertaking. 5. Where undertakings are accepted the investigation shall be terminated. The Commission shall terminate the investigation in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 25(3). 6. If the undertakings are accepted, the investigation of subsidisation and injury shall normally … 379 unchanged words … of the best information available, where there is reason to believe that an undertaking is being breached, or in the case of breach or withdrawal of an undertaking, where the investigation which led to the undertaking has not been concluded.